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 Legal and political theory have paid a great deal of attention to supermajority 
rules,1 which require a fraction of votes greater than 1/2 + 1 to change the status quo, and 
thus empower a minority to block change. In this paper I consider the opposite deviation 
from simple majority voting: submajority rules, under which a voting minority is granted 
the affirmative power to change the status quo. Submajority rules are rarely discussed,2 
either because they are assumed not to exist,3 or because they are assumed to lack any 
institutional virtues, or because submajoritarian decisions are assumed to be chronically 
unstable in light of the risk that subsequent majorities will reverse or undo the 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Prepared for “The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional 
State,” University of Alberta’s Centre on Constitutional Studies, Banff, Canada 2004. Thanks to Elizabeth 
Garrett, Derek Jinks, Nina Mendelson, David Strauss, David Weisbach and participants at a University of 
Chicago faculty workshop for helpful comments, and to Carli Spina for excellent research assistance. The 
Russell J. Parsons Research Fund provided generous support. 
1 For a recent overview, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian 
Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703 (2002). 
2 A useful exception is Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 
136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067 (1988). But Revesz and Karlan confine themselves to courts (in fact the Supreme 
Court), whereas I shall emphasize the many interesting examples of submajority rules that arise in 
legislatures and other nonjudicial institutions. 
3 See Dennis C. Mueller, PUBLIC CHOICE III, 77 at n. 7 (2003) (denying that either House of Congress uses 
a less than 50 percent majority rule). It is unclear whether Mueller means to confine his remark to final 
passage of legislation; if so, but only if so, the remark is correct. One of my principal aims here is to 
rationalize or justify the use of submajority rules only for agenda-setting and other preliminary or 
procedural matters, as opposed to substantive decisionmaking.  
 
Submajority Rules 
submajority’s decision.4 I will dispute all three assumptions. 
As to the first, submajority rules are not common, but there are important examples in 
both legislatures and other institutions, and in the constitutions of many jurisdictions. 
Among the examples I will consider are: 
● The Journal Clause, which allows 1/5 of the legislators present in either House to 
force a roll-call vote; 
● The discharge rule in the House, which (at various points, although not today) has 
permitted a specified minority of legislators to force bills out of committee for 
consideration on the floor; 
● Senate Rule XXII, under which a cloture petition is valid when signed by sixteen 
Senators;  
● The “Seven Member Rule,” under which a minority of designated committees in 
the House and Senate can require the executive branch to divulge information; 
● House Rule XI, which entitles committee minorities to call witnesses at hearings; 
● The famous “Rule of Four” that allows four Justices to grant a writ of certiorari and 
thereby put a case on the Supreme Court’s agenda. 
● Rules governing direct democracy that permit a defined minority of a state’s 
electorate to place a question on the ballot, or to force a recall election. 
● Rules governing international organizations, which frequently allow a defined 
minority to call an emergency session or to force a roll-call vote.  
                                                 
4 See infra notes ---. 
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As to the second assumption, submajority rules have important procedural and 
epistemic virtues. Their principal benefit, I will suggest, is to enable a minority to force 
public accountability upon the majority, thereby improving deliberation overall. As to the 
third assumption, the reversibility problem can be and is dampened either through other 
institutional rules and norms that protect submajoritarian decisions, or by the simpler 
expedient of adopting submajority rules only for decisions that are inherently irreversible 
or costly to reverse, such as decisions that release information into the public domain. 
I.  Submajority Rules and Near Relations 
Every voting rule is a submajority rule in the trivial sense that a submajority’s vote 
can be decisive with respect to the institutional choice. In the most trivial case, under 
majority rule any individual’s vote might be decisive when pooled with the votes of 50% 
of the group. More substantively, asymmetrical supermajority rules notoriously afford 
decisive veto power to submajorities—typically 2/5 + 1, 1/3 +1, or even 1/5 + 1—who 
are empowered to block alteration of the status quo. 
The criterion of decisiveness is obviously too broad. A more useful definition for 
present purposes is as follows: a submajority rule is a voting rule that authorizes (i) a 
predefined numerical minority (ii) to change the status quo (not merely to prevent 
change) (iii) regardless of the distribution of other votes. Note that, for either submajority 
or supermajority rules, the “status quo” referenced in condition (ii) can be procedural as 
well as substantive. House Rule XXVII, which requires a 2/3 supermajority to agree to a 
suspension of the House Rules themselves, allows a minority to block change in the 
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procedural status quo, whereas the Supreme Court’s Rule of Four authorizes a 
submajority of four Justices to change the procedural status quo.5 
This definition excludes majority rule, which trivially fails condition (i), and which 
also fails condition (iii) because any given individual (and thus any minority) can be 
decisive only given some particular distribution of other votes—in the individual case, 
where the other voters are equally divided. Supermajority rules, on the other hand, fail 
condition (ii).6 Moreover, condition (i) excludes institutions, like legislative committees 
or juries, that provide a submajority of some larger body (such as the whole legislature or 
the jury-eligible population) with decisionmaking authority or agenda control over 
designated issues. Although such bodies can in effect grant minorities the de facto power 
to affect the agenda or otherwise change the status quo,7 and are thus relatives of the 
institutions I will discuss, nonetheless committees, juries and the like typically vote 
according to an internal majority rule or supermajority rule, not a submajority rule. My 
focus here is on formal or de jure submajority rules, which have the strikingly 
countermajoritarian property that fewer votes beat more votes even within the designated 
voting group. 
                                                 
5 Note too that, in institutional settings, the “status quo” is defined by institutional rules. There is no claim 
here that the status quo would be well-defined in some apolitical sense, apart from the institution’s rules, 
but on the other hand there is no conceptual problem with identifying the status quo when it is so specified.  
6 The text ignores the complications that arise from the rare case of symmetrical supermajority rules, which 
can be used where the status quo is not the default choice; then no decision is made unless it gains the 
requisite supermajority. See Robert Goodin & Christian List, Special Majorities Rationalized (Aug. 15, 
2003)(unpublished manuscript). Symmetrical supermajority rules enable a predefined minority to create 
nontrivial ties—situations in which no option is chosen—but not to change the status quo, because there is 
no status quo; symmetrical supermajority rules are thus excluded by condition (ii) in a literal, albeit 
vacuous, sense. These complications are not important for present purposes, so I shall use “supermajority 
rules” strictly to refer to the more common case of asymmetrical supermajority rules, under which failure to 
reach a supermajority decision is equivalent to a choice in favor of the status quo. 
7 On the affirmative agenda-setting power of legislative committees (as opposed to their negative 
gatekeeping power), see David P. Baron & John Ferejohn, The Power to Propose, in MODELS OF 
STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS (Peter Ordeshook ed., 1989). 
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Condition (ii) is critical for the following reason. Putting aside the effect of the status 
quo, any rule that licenses a submajority of n/x to reach a decision D might be 
redescribed as a converse rule licensing a supermajority of (x–n+1)/x to reach a decision 
~D. “[T]he rules ‘Four votes are required to grant certiorari’ and ‘Six votes are required 
to defeat certiorari’ on a nine-judge court are distinguished only by the impact of 
abstentions.”8 Although the difference is small in the judicial setting, in other institutions, 
such as legislatures and direct democracy, the status quo will often matter, precisely 
because abstentions are predictable and important. In III.C. I will suggest that a prime 
reason for choosing a submajority rule over the converse supermajority rule is that 
institutional designers might justifiably prefer one status quo position over another, either 
because the supermajority reciprocal is conceptually ill-defined, or because the larger 
transaction costs of assembling a supermajority coalition make the default rule sticky. 
Our working definition also excludes simple plurality voting, under which the option 
with the most (first-place) votes wins even if it is not an outright majority. Plurality 
voting fails condition (i), because the requisite winning plurality is defined strictly in 
relational terms ex post, rather than as an predetermined fraction of votes cast or of the 
voting group. The comparison between plurality voting and submajority rules emphasizes 
a striking consequence of condition (iii): Under submajority rules, the predefined 
minority prevails even in a pairwise contest in which all other votes, a majority of the 
whole, are actually cast for the rejected option. Submajority decisions are thus the 
                                                 
8 Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82, 99 (1986). 
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clearest, and crudest, counterexample to the idea that the voting minority recedes when 
and because it becomes common knowledge that it is a minority.9 
Plurality voting systems often go to great lengths either to eliminate or to paper over 
the awkward possibility that the plurality choice might lose in a pairwise competition 
with one or more of the rejected options or candidates. An example of the elimination 
strategy is the combination of plurality voting with a runoff election for the top two 
votegetters, which burnishes the majoritarian credentials of the eventual winner. An 
example of the papering-over strategy is the structure of the California recall procedure: 
if recalled by a simple majority, the former governor is disqualified from entering the 
replacement election under plurality voting,10 perhaps to avoid the jarringly 
countermajoritarian spectacle of a governor rejected by a majority and immediately 
reinstated by a small plurality. A successful submajority vote, by contrast, emphasizes the 
countermajoritarian features of the decision, especially but not only in binary decisions. If 
100 Senators are present and 20 desire to record the Yeas and Nays then, by force of the 
Journal Clause, they are recorded; it is irrelevant whether the various alternative methods 
of vote-counting are all on the table and the remaining Senators split their votes among 
them, or instead vote en masse, 80-20, for some one other method and against the 
submajority. 
II. Some Virtues of Submajority Rules 
In essence, submajority rules are countermajoritarian because they violate the 
neutrality feature of majority rule, which requires that no choice be preferred over 
                                                 
9 James Fitzjames Stephen, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 28 (1873) (“The minority gives way not 
because it is convinced that it is wrong, but because it is convinced that it is a minority”). 
10 See Cal. Const., art. II, § 15(c). 
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another by the voting rule itself.11 “Where submajority rules are in play typically one 
outcome is favored, in the sense that it will be adopted if it receives k votes, whether or 
not some other outcome also receives k.”12 The most striking feature of submajority rules 
is this flaunting of countermajoritarianism. Why, and under what circumstances, would a 
well-motivated institutional designer wish to adopt a rule of this sort? 
The key point, I will suggest, is that submajority rules are never used directly for final 
substantive decisions, such as the passage or defeat of legislation. Instead they are used 
for procedural and collateral matters: to set institutional agendas, to decide what 
information the institution will gather before reaching a decision, and to publicize the 
decisions the institution has reached (by majority or supermajority vote). Decisions on 
these matters will, of course, have indirect effects on outcomes. But submajority rules are 
best understood in deliberative and procedural terms, as devices for forcing public 
accountability on the majority. Although the proximate effect of these rules is to shape 
institutional agendas and the informational environment, their ultimate effect is to push 
institutions in the direction of decisionmaking according to public reason and 
discursively justifiable principles, rather than private bargaining. 
A. Preliminaries 
The only voting procedure that directly determines substantive outcomes by 
submajoritarian standards is lottery voting, under which the votes for and against a 
proposal become tickets in a random draw. In the most radical versions, a bill favored by 
                                                 
11 See Kenneth O. May, A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority 
Decision, 20 Econometrica 680 (1952). 
12 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note ---, at 99. The Rule of Four, for example, violates neutrality because 
four votes for certiorari prevail, whereas four votes against certiorari lose. Asymmetrical supermajority 
rules also violate neutrality. Thus, in the Senate, 40 votes to continue debate succeed in defeating a cloture 
motion, whereas 40 votes to cut off debate fail. 
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only 10% of the legislature nonetheless has a 10% chance of being enacted. But lottery 
voting does not empower a predefined minority, so it fails condition (i) of our definition; 
and in any event lottery voting, though often proposed in various forms, to date remains 
strictly hypothetical. Besides the general reluctance of modern institutions to adopt 
randomized decision rules,13 a prime reason for the nonexistence of lottery voting is 
doubtless that its brutally countermajoritarian effect is widely deemed unacceptable in 
examples like the one above, at least in situations where the Jury Theorem applies. I 
return to this issue in III.B. below. 
Submajority rules, then, are used for agenda-setting, publicity and procedure, but 
never for final substantive decisions. This pattern can be justified on the following 
grounds: (1) an institution that is committed to making final substantive decisions by 
majority or supermajority vote, for the standard reasons, might work better if minorities 
have the power to force accountability upon the majority; and (2) submajority rules are a 
useful way to confer that power. Accountability-forcing is accomplished by empowering 
minorities, through submajority rules, to force the majority to make a highly visible, 
ultimate substantive decision on a given question, rather than disposing of the issue in 
some less prominent fashion, including simple inaction. Increasing the visibility of final 
decisions will affect outcomes by increasing the ratio of publicly or discursively 
justifiable decisions to decisions based on private bargaining. (As I will discuss in II.E, if 
we hold a certain vision of politics, we will count this displacement of bargaining by 
arguing14 as a vice rather than a virtue; for purposes of the preliminary discussion I will 
                                                 
13 Jon Elster, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 62 (1997); Bernard 
Manin, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 42 (1997).  
14 Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 345 (2000). 
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simply assume that publicly justifiable decisionmaking is an overall good). In the 
remainder of this section I will untangle a few different threads of these ideas. 
A caveat: this is a strictly evaluative point, not an account of how submajority rules 
come to be. I do not claim, in any of the examples that follow, either that actual 
institutional actors adopted submajority rules with the intention of producing these 
benefits, or that the rules’ existence can in some other way be explained by their 
functional merits. The genetic puzzle of submajority rules is that, in many cases, the 
submajority enjoys its special voting power only by virtue of a delegation from the 
majority itself, or from a higher majority.15 Thus a majority of the Supreme Court could 
probably change the Rule of Four, and a majority of Congress could certainly do so; a 
majority of the whole Congress has delegated submajoritarian voting power by statute (in 
the case of the Seven Member Rule), while a majority of the House has delegated power 
by internal rule (in the case of House Rule XI). But that is true of many majority or 
supermajority voting rules as well; some higher-order majority vote often suffices to 
change the voting rule itself. Thus when the House by internal rule required a 3/5 
supermajority to adopt new taxes, the best view is that the rule was certainly 
constitutional because amendable by a simple majority of future Houses;16 indeed, on one 
                                                 
15 A speculation might be that submajority rules come into existence only when the majority that creates the 
rule fears that it will soon become a minority. Perhaps the majority is certain that it will lose power, and 
thus creates submajoritarian procedural rights to improve its lot when in opposition. This would be a 
defensive analogue to the usual attempts of outgoing majorities to entrench their power through legislation, 
judicial appointments, and the like. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to 
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 American Political Science 
Review 511-24 (2002). Or perhaps the majority is uncertain about its future status, and the uncertainty 
causes it to adopt rules, including submajority rules, that are welfare-maximizing for all parties. See Adrian 
Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L.J. 399 (2001). 
16 See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1997); John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, 
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 Yale L.J. 483 (1995). 
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admittedly controversial view, it would be constitutional even if formally entrenched,17 in 
which case the requisite higher-order majority would be a supermajority of states 
adopting a constitutional amendment, rather than a majority of the body that adopted the 
entrenched statute. 
None of this is my concern here. Whatever the mechanisms that produce submajority 
rules, I want to argue only that, from an external standpoint, hypothetical institutional 
designers who wish to promote majoritarian accountability in decisionmaking might 
approve of submajoritarian procedural rules or sensibly choose to employ them as part of 
an overall design, where their benefits cannot be attained at lower cost by adopting some 
other voting rule or design mechanism. 
B.  Distributing agenda-setting power 
Submajority rules often have the effect of distributing agenda-setting power away 
from majorities to minorities. The leading examples in American law are the Rule of 
Four, 18 which authorizes any four Justices to put a case on the Supreme Court’s calendar 
for plenary hearing and disposition, and the rule governing discharge petitions in the 
House of Representatives, which, at various points between 1910 and 1935, authorized 
145 or 150 legislators to force a bill out of committee.19 There are similar rules governing 
                                                 
17 Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 
1665 (2002) with John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional 
and Normative Theory, 89 Va. L. Rev. 385 (2003) and Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 
71 G.W. L. Rev. 231 (2003). 
18 See Robert L. Stern et al., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (8th ed. 2002). There is also a little-known, and 
empirically unimportant, “Rule of Three” that governs the decision whether to hold a case pending plenary 
review of a related case. See Revesz & Karlan, supra note ---, at 1068. 
19 See Sarah A. Binder, MINORITY RIGHT, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CONGRESS 136-53 (1997). If the requisite number of signatures were present, the resulting floor vote would 
not be on final passage but on the motion to discharge the committee. Both the discharge motion and final 
passage would, of course, require a majority of a quorum. In what follows I ignore this wrinkle. 
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international organizations as well.20 
But why, if at all, should agenda-setting power be distributed in this way? In the 
judicial case, the Justices first articulated the Rule of Four to assuage two related 
congressional fears: first, that granting the Court discretionary jurisdiction over (most of) 
its docket would result in arbitrary selection; second, that “too few” cases would be 
granted for plenary hearing, while most cases would be disposed of through summary 
action or simple denial.21 Yet these concerns are underdeveloped. As to the first, the 
Justices’ criteria of fair selection are vague,22 and in any event it is unclear why a 
submajority voting rule would implement those criteria more accurately than an ordinary 
majority rule. The second concern articulates no theory of optimal docket size that would 
tell us how many cases are “too few,” and it seems to assume, oddly, that the Justices are 
docket-minimizers, perhaps from a desire to maximize leisure. The subsequent history of 
the Court’s discretionary docket, however, suggests if anything that the Justices will often 
push the Court’s agenda capacity to the limit, so no simple docket-minimizing picture is 
persuasive. 
A better idea is that a submajoritarian agenda rule can force majoritarian 
accountability. We can interpret accountability in two ways: either as accountability to 
the claims of reason, or as accountability motivated by the desire to appear reasonable. 
                                                 
20 Such rules typically empower submajorities to convene special sessions of international bodies. See, e.g., 
UNESCO, Manual of the General Conference and Rules of Procedure of the Executive Board, Section D, 
Art. 9 available online at <http://www.unesco.org/confgen/en/articles/article4.htm> (visited Jan. 20, 2004) 
(authorizing 1/3 of members to call a special session); WIPO, Convention Establishing the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, Stockholm, Art. 6(4)(b) available online at 
<http://www.certh.gr/cordis/t_en/i/i_410_en.asp-adt_id=6&ads=0.htm> (visited Jan. 20, 2004) (authorizing 
1/4 of members to call an emergency session). 
21 See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U L. Rev. 1, 14 (1983). 
22 See Supreme Court Rule X (certiorari is discretionary; relevant factors are conflict between lower federal 
courts or state courts and the importance of the federal issue presented). 
 11
Submajority Rules 
On the first interpretation, we assume that members of the majority will deliberate 
sincerely, on the basis of publicly justifiable reasons, if only the relevant questions can be 
forced upon their attention. The majority’s preferences, or its views, are endogenous to 
the quantity and quality of deliberation that the institution gives to a particular issue. The 
submajoritarian agenda rule then allows the minority to focus the majority’s attention by 
putting the decision under the most intensive form of scrutiny the institution affords—
floor debate (in legislatures), full argument on the merits (in courts), or some other 
equivalent. Applying this picture to the judicial setting, the 5-member majority is 
especially accountable to the claims of legal reason advanced by the minority during full-
dress argument, and may change its views accordingly.  
On the second interpretation of accountability-forcing, we assume that members of 
the majority act strategically to maximize the satisfaction of fixed preferences. The 
underlying preferences themselves will not be changed by group deliberation, although 
deliberation might provide useful information. Nonetheless, a submajority agenda rule 
can still promote majoritarian accountability by raising the political visibility of the 
relevant decisions. If members of the majority are concerned for their public reputations, 
visibility can force majority-bloc members to behave as though their actions are 
motivated by publicly justifiable reasons. 
I will illustrate the second interpretation in both the certiorari setting and the 
legislative setting. In the former setting, on this account, the Rule of Four serves to 
prevent an entrenched 5-Justice majority from simply disposing of disfavored claims 
through low-visibility procedures.23 (Historically, we might speculate that progressive 
                                                 
23 See Revesz & Karlan, supra note ---, at 1108. 
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legislators feared that a conservative majority would bury cases brought by states seeking 
to overturn intrusive economic due process decisions issued by lower courts). At time 1, 
let us suppose, the entrenched majority rejected Claim C by articulating principle P. 
Suppose also that in a different case, to be decided at time 2, principle P logically entails 
not only Claim C but also Claim C’—a result that the majority dislikes. A low-visibility 
disposition would enable the majority to sweep C’ under the rug at time 2, while a highly 
visible decision on the merits would force the majority to adopt C’ on the basis of the 
previously articulated principle P, or else be exposed as opportunists; this is the 
“civilizing force of hypocrisy.”24 On this view, the submajoritarian agenda rule works to 
counteract the “subtle vices of the passive virtues”25—the ability of entrenched majorities 
to exploit various low-visibility techniques for disposing of cases in unprincipled ways. 
This account assumes that certiorari denials or summary dispositions are less visible 
than merits decisions. The assumption may be objectionable on methodological grounds. 
It casually posits that the audience for judicial opinions is differentially ignorant, either 
because the cost of monitoring summary dispositions or certiorari denials is appreciably 
higher than the cost of monitoring merits decisions, or because the audience is subject to 
some form of flawed cognition—salience or availability—that sophisticated interest 
groups cannot wholly dispel. But perhaps we ought not be too impressed by the 
methodological infirmity of the assumption, if it has the ring of truth about it.  
The analysis is similar in the legislative setting. In the House of Representatives, 
proponents of the submajoritarian discharge rule justified it by arguing that the rule 
                                                 
24 Elster, Arguing and Bargaining, supra note ---, at 349. 
25 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues:” A Comment on Principle and Expediency in 
Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964). 
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empowered minorities to force majorities to put up or shut up on the floor.26 When a 
submajority requirement of 150 was adopted in 1924, 
Mr. Crisp of Georgia . . . stated that he was a believer in control by the majority party, 
but continued: “I believe the minority party has the right to smoke out the majority 
and make them face issues, make them vote on great public questions.”27 
 
This argument assumes that floor disposition is more visible to interested publics than 
killing a bill in committee; if so, then the discharge rule forces public justification of the 
majority’s preferred disposition. And if the reasons that enacting majorities or their 
agents gave, on previous occasions, impose consistency constraints even on rationally 
self-interested legislators—as the civilizing force of hypocrisy supposes—then the 
requirement of public justification may indirectly constrain or alter legislative outcomes.  
C.  Information, agendas and publicity  
A closely related function of submajority rules is to allow minorities to collect and 
publicize information that the majority would prefer not to admit into the public record. 
Examples are the “Seven Member Rule,”28 allowing a designated minority of designated 
committees to force formal disclosure of executive-branch documents, and House Rule 
XI, which entitles committee minorities to call witnesses at investigatory and oversight 
                                                 
26 Note that discharge is an issue only in the House, because only the House rules bar nongermane 
amendments on the floor. Senate rules allow nongermane amendments, so that any bill squelched by a 
committee can be proposed, by any Senator, as an amendment to unrelated legislation under debate. See 
Charles Teifer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 
Admin. L. Rev. 199, 205 (1998).  
27 Paul DeWitt Hasbrouck, PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 153 (1927). 
28 5 U.S.C. §2954 provides: 
An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on Government Operations [now the 
Committee on Government Reform] of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members 
thereof, or on request of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, or any five 
members thereof, shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the committee. 
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hearings.29 In some cases the power to generate information of record just is agenda-
setting power in a de facto sense. Legislative majorities set their agendas in light of the 
information known to them and the information known to relevant publics; by changing 
the latter, submajorities may force a new agenda item upon the majority or block an 
agenda item the majority previously intended to pursue. Here too we may interpret the 
resulting accountability in two ways. On the deliberative interpretation, the power to put 
information or arguments on the public stage may force the majority to respond in kind, 
by generating better data in support of a proposed action, or better arguments. On the 
strategic interpretation, the pressure to respond to information or arguments generated by 
submajorities may force majorities who are subject to the civilizing force of hypocrisy to 
not only talk the language of public reason, but actually to act as if motivated by public 
principle. 
D. Voting, agency and transparency 
The common theme, then, is that submajority rules subject the majority to public 
accountability that improves majoritarian decisionmaking. Although the immediate 
valence of the rules is dramatically countermajoritarian, their downstream effects may 
thus be justified in majoritarian terms. 
On this account, the paradigmatic submajority rule in the U.S. Constitution is the 
Journal Clause, which provides: 
                                                 
29 See House Rule XI (j)(1) (minority members shall be entitled to call witnesses upon request by a 
majority of the minority). House Rule XI (2)(c)(2) allows three members of a standing committee to file a 
written request that the chair call a special meeting of the committee, but if the chair takes no action a 
majority is ultimately required to force a meeting, so this is not strictly a submajority rule. In the 
international setting, there are many clear examples of submajority rules that authorize the minority to call 
a special or emergency session.  
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Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the 
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas 
and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one 
fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.30 
This provision makes a number of fundamental design choices; most critically, for 
open voting rather than the secret ballot in Congress, at least as to some matters and on 
the request of a minority of legislators.31 Also important are the design possibilities the 
clause rejects, and that are present in constitutions of other jurisdictions, such as 
constitutionally-mandated roll-call voting in legislative committees32 and a public right of 
physical access to legislative proceedings.33 To understand the stakes in all this, consider 
that throughout most of its history the English Parliament operated in secrecy and indeed 
punished attempts to publish records of its proceedings, that the Continental Congress 
initially closed its proceedings to outsiders and the constitutional convention did so 
throughout, and that even today most legislatures use secret ballots to select their officers 
while some, like the Italian Parliament, have until quite recently used them for final 
voting on legislation.34 The transparency of legislative deliberation and voting is in broad 
historical compass a recent design innovation, and a normatively controversial one. 
                                                 
30 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
31 Note that the Clause requires only one-fifth “of those present” to trigger a roll-call vote, not one-fifth of a 
quorum. But in the Senate (not the House), the practice is for the presiding officer to assume that a quorum 
is present until it is otherwise determined. Under that assumption, at least eleven Senators are required to 
join the roll-call request (one-fifth of a quorum of 51, rounding up), which may often be more than one-
fifth of those actually present. Under senatorial courtesy, however, the leadership will often help members 
to arrange a desired roll-call. See Tiefer, supra note --- at 530-33. House Rule XX(1)(b) allows “one-fifth of 
a quorum” to call for an “recorded vote” that “shall be considered a vote by the yeas and nays.” See Rules 
of the House of Representatives XX(1)(b), H.R. Doc. No. 107-284, 107th Cong. (2001); see Tiefer, supra 
note ---, at 358. 
32 See, e.g., IDAHO CONST., art. III, § 12; IOWA CONST., art. III, § 10; LA. CONST., art. III, § 10; MICH. 
CONST., art. IV, § 17; MONT. CONST., art. V, § 11.2. 
33 See, e.g., IDAHO CONST., art. III, § 12; IOWA CONST., art. III, § 10. 
34 For documentation of these historical points, see Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of 
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004). 
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Transparency is a solution to an agency problem. Voters are the principals, legislators 
are the agents, and constitutional provisions that force agents to publicize their actions 
lower the monitoring costs that principals must incur, thereby making principals and 
trustworthy agents better off. At the constitutional convention, framers spoke in general 
terms about the agency problem for which transparency is a cure. James Wilson argued 
that “The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it 
should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings.”35 We may 
thus understand the 1/5 trigger for roll-call voting as a means by which constitutional 
designers join forces with future legislative minorities to control future legislative 
majorities. We may surmise that the framers anticipated that competition between 
legislative factions would routinely produce public voting, as indeed it has done. 
Legislative majorities (although not voters) might be better off if legislators could agree 
to enforce strict secrecy provisions, but legislative minorities armed with the 
submajoritarian roll-call power produce socially beneficial transparency. By enlisting the 
interests of future legislative minorities, constitutional framers force accountability upon 
future legislative majorities, in the higher interests of the electoral or popular majorities 
whose agents the legislators are. 
If this is indeed the core idea of the Journal Clause, it is not without costs. For one 
thing, it is possible that open roll-call voting would have resulted even without a 
constitutional trigger. Where present or would-be legislators compete to achieve or retain 
office, legislator-agents themselves benefit by reducing the costs of monitoring to 
                                                 
35 2 Farrand at 260 (Madison as reported by Jared Sparks). 
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principals.36 By offering contracts or arrangements that lower expected agency costs, 
either by reducing monitoring costs or in other ways, would-be agents induce principals 
to select them rather than others, and to entrust them with more discretionary authority 
than they otherwise would. 
There is also an important procedural cost to the submajoritarian trigger for roll-call 
voting. Constitutional designers in the states37 and in other polities, such as Canada and 
Japan,38 have tied submajority rules to publicity, especially roll-call voting, in similar 
ways. But no polity (of which I am aware) allows a single legislator to force a roll-call 
vote.39 The tradeoff that explains this pattern is obvious; constitutional designers face an 
optimization problem. On the one hand, submajority rules allow minorities to force 
accountability on majorities; and we are supposing that this is beneficial. On the other 
hand, there is a cost to roll-call voting. As Story put it, 
The restriction of call of the yeas and nays to one fifth is founded upon the necessity 
of preventing too frequent a recurrence to this mode of ascertaining the votes, at the 
mere caprice of an individual. A call consumes a great deal of time, and often 
embarrasses the just progress of beneficial measures. It is said to have been often 
used to excess in the congress under the confederation; and even under the present 
constitution it is notoriously used, as an occasional annoyance, by a dissatisfied 
                                                 
36 See John Ferejohn, ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUTHORITY: TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY, IN DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION 131 (Adam Przeworski, 
Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds, 1999).  
37 See, e.g. CAL. CONST. Art. IV §7B (stating “Each house shall keep and publish a journal of its 
proceedings. The rollcall vote of the members on a question shall be taken and entered in the journal at the 
request of 3 members present”); HAW. CONST. Art. III §12 (stating “The ayes and noes of the members on 
any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of the members present, be entered upon the journal.”). 
38 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PARLIAMENTARY DOCUMENTATION OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 
Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium 480 (2nd ed., 1986)(in Canada, all votes 
are voice votes unless 5 MP’s request a roll call); JAPAN CONST. Chapter III Art. 57 §3 (“Upon demand of 
one-fifth or more of the members present, votes of the members on any matter shall be recorded in the 
minutes”). 
39 However, in some international organizations a single member can force a roll-call vote. See, e.g., Rules 
of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/3/Rev.6 (2001) (Rule 52), available 
online at <http:// www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/> (visited Jan. 20, 2004); Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/C/4 (1991) (Rule 54), available online at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/> (visited Jan. 20, 2004). Note that these organizations typically have 
far fewer members than a domestic legislature. In a decisionmaking body with a small number of members, 
the optimum might also be equivalent to the minimum -- one member.  
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minority, to retard the passage of measures, which are sanctioned by the approbation 
of a strong majority.40 
 
This optimization problem was debated quite explicitly at the constitutional 
convention. At one extreme, Gouvernor Morris “urged that if the yeas and nays were 
proper at all any individual ought to be authorized to call for them”; he feared that “the 
small States may otherwise be under a disadvantage, and find it difficult to get a 
concurrence of 1/5.”41 At the other extreme, several members complained that roll-calls 
had been abused, in the states, by “stuffing the journals with them on frivolous 
occasions.”42 George Mason spoke for the silent majority on this issue: he praised the 1/5 
rule as “a middle way between two extremes,”43 presumably the point at which the net 
benefits of the rule reach an internal maximum. 
Two other submajority rules—one actual, one hypothetical—also illustrate this 
optimization problem. The actual one is Senate Rule XXII (2), under which a cloture 
petition (a petition to vote to cut off debate) can be lodged with the signatures of sixteen 
senators, and is given priority in the order of business. A much lower numerical threshold 
would permit harassing petitions by outlying senators on either extreme;44 a much higher 
one would collapse the decision to file a cloture petition with the vote on the merits of the 
petition. The hypothetical example is a proposal under which the signatures of ten 
representatives or twenty senators would be necessary, but also sufficient, to raise a 
                                                 
40 Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Book III, §842 (2nd ed, 
1851).  
41 5 Debates on the adoption of the federal Constitution, in the convention held at Philadelphia, in 1787, at 
407 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1881). 
42 Id. at 407 (quoting Mr. Gorham). 
43 Id. at 407. 
44 Cf. 55 Cong. Rec. 24 (65th Cong., March 8, 1917) (statement of Senator Sherman) (“by this day’s work 
[adopting the original version of Rule XXII] a majority of the Senate hereafter will be enabled to apply the 




constitutional point of order against a pending bill.45 In the latter example, “the 
requirement [of a submajority] makes the point-of-order strategy more costly to those 
trying to use it to force changes in the bill, but it still allows a small group of intensely 
concerned lawmakers to bring the attention of the full body to a constitutional issue.”46 
 E. Transparency, deliberation, and bargaining 
The discussion so far has argued that submajority rules allow minorities to force 
public accountability upon unwilling majorities; and that the pressure of public 
accountability pushes decisionmaking, by legislatures and other institutions, in the 
direction of transparently articulated principle and public consistency. 
It is hardly clear, of course, that consistent decisionmaking according to transparent 
principle is a good thing. At a general level, the institutional-design tradeoffs inherent in 
transparent decisionmaking are well understood,47 although it is a daunting empirical task 
to specify how the relevant variables should be weighed in particular settings. 
Transparency reduces the cost to principals, such as citizens and voters, of monitoring 
their agents, such as legislators, who absent monitoring would divert resources to 
themselves or simply shirk their official duties. It is thus a favored recipe of democrats 
and good-government reformers who seek to reduce official corruption and to encourage 
regular attendance by legislators; we have seen that agents may even compete among 
themselves by offering principals institutional arrangements that provide for ever-greater 
transparency. 
                                                 
45 Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 Duke L.J. 1277, 
1329 (2001) 
46 Id.  
47 For discussion, see Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. 
L. 345 (2000); David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTIUTIONAL DESIGN 154-98 
(Robert E. Goodin ed. 1996); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 Yale L.J. 1311 (1999). 
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This is all to the good as far as it goes, but transparency has important costs, in part 
precisely because of its democratizing effects; transparency changes official and 
legislative deliberation both for good and for ill. Without transparency, agents gain less 
from adopting positions that resonate with immediate popular passions, so transparency 
may exacerbate the effects of decisionmaking pathologies that sometimes grip mobilized 
publics.48 Transparency subjects public deliberation to reputational constraints: officials 
will stick to initial positions, once announced, for fear of appearing to vacillate or 
capitulate, and this effect will make deliberation more polarized and more partisan. The 
framers closed the Philadelphia convention to outsiders precisely to prevent initial 
positions from hardening prematurely.49 
The pressure to take a principled public stand also dampens explicit bargaining.50 
Although anticorruption reformers count this as an unqualified good, it is in fact a 
qualified one. Bargains may represent corrupt deals by which agents enrich themselves at 
principals’ expense, but bargains also permit logrolls that may allow the legislative 
process to register the intensity of constituents’ preferences,51 and that help to appease 
                                                 
48 Many public pathologies are relevant here, including reputational and informational cascades, preference 
falsification, rational and irrational herding behavior, and group polarization. See Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 175 (2002); Timur Kuran, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995); Jacob Gersen, Informational Cascades, 
Cognitive Bias, and Catastrophic Risk (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
49 See Elster, Arguing and Bargaining, supra note ---, at 386: 
"At the Federal Convention, the sessions were closed and secret. As Madison said later: ‘Had the members 
committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to 
maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any 
longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.’"(citing 3 
Farrand at 479 (Madison as reported by Jared Sparks)). 
50 An interesting example of this effect is provided by a NATO rule that allows any delegate to demand a 
separate vote on each paragraph or part of a proposal. The effect of the rule, and presumably the intention 
of its framers, is to dampen logrolling by allowing a minority to put each of the elements of a bundled 
proposal to a separate vote. See Rules of Procedure for the Parliament of NATO, 123 GEN 03B (2003) at 
Art. 26(4) available online at <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?TAB=346> (visited Jan. 4, 2004). 
51 Logrolling may, of course, either permit socially beneficial trades or inflict socially harmful externalities 
on nontraders. Much depends on the details of the situation. “Today, no consensus exists in the normative 
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policy losers by giving everyone something. Argument by reference to public principle, 
by contrast, is a hydraulic force that presses competing camps towards total victory or 
total defeat. Alternatively, transparency might simply drive decisionmaking underground, 
creating “deliberations” that are sham rituals while the real bargaining is conducted in 
less accessible and less formal venues, off the legislative floor or in closed committee 
markup sessions. 
These remarks are general; to illustrate the tradeoff concretely, we may point to the 
similar ambiguity surrounding open roll-call voting within legislatures. Open voting 
allows legislators to give third parties credible, because verifiable, commitments to vote 
in particular ways in return for bribes or in response to threats. With secret voting, by 
contrast, legislators cannot strike credible vote-selling bargains with the executive or 
interest groups, so the value of legislators’ votes to those groups declines.52 From the 
standpoint of voter-principals, the ability of legislators to credibly commit to sell votes to 
interest groups represents an agency cost insofar as the interest groups’ goals differ from 
the voters’.53 To be sure, even with secret voting interest groups may pay for outcomes 
rather than actions, offering legislators payments conditional on favorable legislative 
decisions. Yet interest groups can always pay for outcomes, even with open voting, so 
secret voting at least reduces the value of the legislator’s vote by removing one 
dimension over which bargains can be struck. And paying legislators for legislative 
                                                                                                                                                 
public choice literature as to whether logrolling is on net welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, that is, 
whether logrolling constitutes a positive- or a negative-sum game.” Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 322 (1997).  
52 Luban, supra note ---, at 187 (citing Sen. Robert Packwood). 
53 It is a separate question whether an open market in votes provides legislators themselves any benefit. As 
Ferejohn points out, ex ante competition between candidates for legislative office may dissipate the rents 
that legislators could otherwise obtain from vote-selling. Ferejohn, supra note --- at 140 n.6. This effect 
merely reallocates rents from legislators to their interest-group supporters; it does nothing to alleviate the 
agency loss to voters of legislative vote-selling, and indeed exacerbates it insofar as increasing expenditures 
on (rent-dissipating) competition between candidates is itself socially wasteful.  
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outcomes is senseless unless interest groups can identify the swing or marginal 
legislators, who alone control outcomes anyway. But the interest groups’ ability to 
identify swing legislators is endogenous to the voting practice; with secret voting, any 
legislator may claim to be marginal in order to win an interest-group payment, but no 
such claims will be credible. 
The upshot of these points is that open voting has cross-cutting or ambiguous effects 
on voters’ control of their legislative agents. On one hand, a switch from secret to open 
voting reduces agency costs by reducing the voters’ costs of monitoring their legislative 
agents. On the other hand, a switch from secret to open voting also creates an agency cost 
by creating an open market for legislative votes, allowing interest groups to divert 
legislators from voters’ goals. These two variables move in opposite directions, so the 
institutional-design question is how the two costs net out. The question is empirical, not a 
priori. 
Evaluating the big tradeoff between deliberation and bargaining, and the smaller 
tradeoff between open voting and secret ballots, plunges us into empirical and normative 
difficulties. At a minimum we must arbitrate between competing empirical priors about 
the agency costs of transparency and secrecy; at a maximum, we might have to choose 
between competing normative accounts of voting, institutional decisionmaking, and 
politics, including the bedrock choice between deliberative accounts of democracy as 
judgment-aggregation and welfarist accounts of democracy as preference-aggregation.54 I 
will avoid these depths. My point here is instead a modest and strictly conditional one: if 
we want to make normative sense of what constitutional designers have done with 
                                                 
54 Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited, Nomos XXXII (1990). 
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submajority rules, the best account is one that depicts submajority rules as devices for 
forcing transparency, and thus accountability, or principle, upon otherwise unwilling 
majorities. 
III. Some Problems with Submajority Rules 
Here I will canvass some problems with submajority rules. Of these, some are 
pseudo-problems, while some represent real costs of using submajority rules in 
institutional design. The most important example in the latter category is the reversibility 
problem, which can, however, be dampened by collateral institutional rules or avoided 
altogether by using submajority rules only for decisions that are costly to reverse or 
intrinsically irreversible. 
A. Cycles, agenda-setting and manipulation 
There is the standard social-choice concern that a submajoritarian rule for agenda-
setting combined with a majority voting rule for substantive decisions enables 
submajorities to manipulate outcomes for countermajoritarian ends, by exploiting latent 
voting cycles. (Note that this problem cuts across the difference between rules that 
empower submajorities to add agenda items, on the one hand, and supermajoritarian 
agenda rules, or equivalent structures like the committee system, that empower minorities 
to affect agendas by blocking items that a majority might wish to consider.) Yet the 
manipulation of outcomes by agenda-setters is not clearly a real-world problem. The 
broadest and most ambitious claims in the massive literature on cycling and agenda-
setting have, to date, achieved great technical refinement but few compelling results for 
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students of real-world lawmaking institutions.55 
At the level of theory, exploitation of the voting many by the agenda-setting few is 
extremely difficult to achieve, and requires strong modeling assumptions even to become 
minimally plausible. For one thing, some of the relevant stories arbitrarily assume that 
the agenda-setter is strategic while the voters are sincere, or that the agenda-setter is fully 
informed about the voters’ rankings while the voters do not understand the agenda-
setter’s aims.56 For another, real institutions never employ the arbitrarily long agenda 
chains necessary to move outcomes to the agenda-setter’s preferred point.57 In models 
that take a slice or snapshot of ongoing institutions, agenda-setters can affect outcomes in 
limited ways, as in the standard models of committees acting under a closed rule. Such 
models, however, just pose the familiar questions about whether and why floor majorities 
permit committees with outlying preferences, relative to the floor median, to exploit 
closed rules or to exist in the first place.58 
Where Congress (rather than some abstract “legislature” or “committee”) is the 
subject, there is all the less reason to think that agenda manipulation is an important 
concern. For one thing, legislators are above all members of political parties, and a two-
party system dampens the possibility of the cycles that are a prerequisite for agenda 
                                                 
55 Here I essentially follow the lead of Gerry Mackie, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003) and Bernard 
Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a “Reasonable 
Choice” Modeler, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1541 (1993). 
56 Mackie, supra note ---, at 18-19, summarizes the author’s critiques of common cycling stories; in many 
cases the story arbitrarily assumes that agenda-setters or manipulators are strategic while other voters 
behave sincerely. 
57 See Grofman, supra note ---, at 1569; Scott Feld et al., Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting 
Games, 1 Mathematical & Computer Modelling 405 (1989). 
58 Canonical treatments of the principal-agent problem between floor and committees include Keith 
Krehbiel, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1992); Barry R. Weingast & William J. 
Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized 
as Markets, 96 Journal of Political Economy 132 (1988); Kenneth A Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The 
Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 American Political Science Review 85 (1987). 
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manipulation. “[A] two-party system inevitably creates a single-dimensional competition 
along the ideological spectrum. The effect of this single-dimensional competition reduces 
the number of likely preference orderings.”59 And, in fact, about 85% of roll-call votes in 
the Congress are predicted by a simple model that uses a single dimension (left-right) to 
measure legislators’ ideologies.60 For another thing, agenda manipulation requires 
sophisticated voting, but legislators will find it difficult to justify clever votes to 
constituents who may see only that the legislator has conspicuously voted against their 
interests and against the legislator’s professed commitments.61 Here is another link 
between submajority rules and publicity or transparency: provisions like the Journal 
Clause increase the number of public roll-call votes, in turn dampening agenda 
manipulation. 
Empirically, it has been notoriously difficult for cycling theorists to demonstrate clear 
cases of agenda manipulation in Congress.62 (Judicial decisionmaking displays better 
examples,63 in part because legislatures enjoy greater scope than courts for logrolling and 
other practices that measure the intensity of participants’ preferences and thus avoid the 
standard cycling conditions.64) As far as Congress goes, early claims that congressional 
history was replete with exploitative agenda-setting have been grievously undermined by 
                                                 
59 Grofman, supra note ---, at 1557. We may add epicycles about cycling, such as the claim that latent or 
hidden cycles occur within the two major parties and are thus important even if the observable action within 
the legislature occurs on a single dimension. This seems unpersuasive, however. Intraparty conflict is 
centrally about money—which factions can bring the most money to the table—and this sort of 
willingness-to-pay to influence political outcomes effectively cardinalizes preferences, whereas the main 
cycling results hold only with ordinal preferences. 
60 See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 Am. J. 
Pol. Sci. 357, 368 (1985). 
61 See Arthur T. Denzau et al., Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style, 79 
American Political Science Review 1117 (1985). 
62 See Mackie, supra note ---; Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 107-13 (1994). 
63 See Maxwell Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309 (1996). 
64 See Maxwell Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L.J. 1219, 1276-80 (1994). 
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subsequent work.65 Levine and Plott famously manipulated a flying club into a 
countermajoritarian decision,66 but were expelled upon publication of their results; the 
danger for unscrupulous agenda manipulators in real lawmaking institutions is that those 
who have been duped in the short run eventually discover the bad faith, and band together 
to punish their overly cunning colleagues. So the possibility of outcome manipulation by 
agenda-setters looks theoretically abstruse, and empirically difficult either for participants 
to achieve or for analysts to confirm, at least in legislatures. 
B. Submajorities and the Jury Theorem 
A different critique is that submajority rules may produce inaccuracy, or less 
accuracy than majority rule would attain, in situations where the conditions for the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem hold.67 This point does not hold uniquely for submajority rules; 
it is equally true for any deviation from simple majority voting, despite the occasional 
                                                 
65 For an example of this ebb-and-flow, compare William H. Riker, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 
(1986) (purporting to identify examples of agenda manipulation in congressional history) with Mackie, 
supra note ---, and Keith Krehbiel & Douglas Rivers, Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration, 
52 Journal of Politics 548 (1990) (both works criticizing Riker’s evidence and conceptual premises). 
Mackie also criticizes, persuasively in my view, the other work purporting to identify legislative cycles, 
such as John L. Neufeld, et al., A Paradox of Voting: Cycling Majorities and the Case of Muscle Shoals, 47 
Political Research Q. 423 (1994). Even if Mackie’s analysis were thought to fail as to one or two examples, 
still the number of identified cycles is trivial—too small a tail to wag the gigantic dog that is the legislative 
cycling literature. 
66 See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 Va. L. Rev. 561 
(1977).  
67 In the following discussion I shall address only versions of the Jury Theorem in which the “correct” 
answer is exogenously chosen or determined. In another, thinner version the Jury Theorem merely captures 
the probability that a majority of the voting pool has correctly chosen the result that a majority of voters 
would consider best promotes their individual interests, rather than the common interest somehow defined. 
See Nicolas R. Miller, Information, electorates and democracy: some extensions and interpretations of the 
Condorcet jury theorem, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISIONMAKING (Bernard Grofman and 
Guillermo Owen, eds.,1986); Paul Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 
J. Legal Stud. 327, 337-39 (2002). In the latter form, however, the Theorem lacks the special epistemic 
credentials that make it normatively challenging for nonmajoritarian decision rules. See Jules Coleman, 
Rationality and the Justification of Democracy, in POLITICS AND PROCESS 194, --- (Geoffrey Brennan and 
Loren Lomasky, eds., 1989). If all the Theorem is aggregating is the probability that the majority has 
correctly determined where its interests lie, minorities or submajorities with different interests owe it no 
normative respect, and the Theorem underwrites no objection to submajority or supermajority rules. 
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confused suggestion68 that supermajority rules do better on the score of accuracy. Apart 
from this tu quoque point, however, how serious is the problem? 
If the sorts of decisions covered by procedural submajority rules indeed fall within 
the Jury Theorem’s scope, then this would be a raw epistemic cost of submajoritarianism. 
Then the only thing left to say would be that submajoritarian inaccuracy at the 
predecisional or agenda-setting stage might trade off against increased jury-theoretic 
accuracy at the stage of substantive decisionmaking. That tradeoff would obtain if, for 
example, the increased publicity accompanying an up-or-down decision on the merits of 
legislation reduces the tendency of legislator-voters to follow the lead of party mavens, 
and thus increases the effective number of independent votes, with a resulting increase in 
the group’s overall accuracy. This is of course a contingent empirical conjecture, and we 
might well think the opposite instead. Publicity might enhance the control of party 
leaders, by making commitments to vote in certain ways more easily monitored, and 
might thus reduce the effective number of independent votes and thus reduce the 
Condorcetian accuracy of the whole voting group. (Of course if party leaders have a very 
high voting competence then group accuracy might possibly increase, despite the 
reduction in the number of votes,69 but under plausible assumptions a larger number of 
                                                 
68 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative 
Theory, 89 Va. L. Rev. 385, 420 n. 119 (2003). The authors say that “the Condorcet jury theorem suggests 
that the greater the number of voters in favor of a measure, the more likely it is to be true. . . . Thus, 
supermajority rules will result in principles and measures that are more likely to be ‘true’ than those 
generated by majority rule.” (internal citation omitted). The first sentence is correct, but the second does 
not follow from the first; in fact the second sentence is a howler. Where the Jury Theorem’s conditions are 
met, so that the average competence of the voter pool is greater than .5, majority rule is optimal, precisely 
because the simple majority subset of all voters is more likely to get the right answer than is any smaller 
subset. The authors have conflated the decision rule (majority or supermajority) with the size of the group 
voting under the rule, whatever it might be. 
69 David M. Estlund, Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited, 83 
American Political Science Review 1317 (1989). 
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moderately competent voters quickly outperforms a single voter of even superhuman 
accuracy).70 
In fact, however, there is little reason to treat most submajoritarian decisions as the 
sort of decisions that fall within the Theorem’s scope in the first place. Even with well-
motivated participants, agenda decisions are value choices about how the institution’s 
time is best spent, not judgments that we might label accurate or inaccurate. Participants 
in agenda decisions are not, or not commonly, trying to converge upon a correct 
judgment on the same question; they are expressing different preferences about how a 
fixed resource, time, should be expended, and each participant may be right (about how 
best to satisfy their own preferences) even if they reach different answers. The same point 
holds for other collateral decisions typically subject to submajority rules, such as the 
decision whether to publicize legislative votes; recall that to publicize voting is always an 
agenda choice in itself, since a principal cost of roll-call voting is time, and the framers’ 
principal fear was that roll-call voting would be abused to delay legislative proceedings. 
Speaking generally, it is hard to see that the Jury Theorem bites at all on the preliminary 
or collateral, nonsubstantive choices that submajority rules, where they exist, typically 
regulate. 
This point, I think, sharpens the contrast with substantive versions of lottery voting 
that permit the enactment of bills or decisions favored by less than a majority.71 
                                                 
70 Thus Przeworksi: 
[A]n assembly of the size n=399 in which the average individual has only a 0.55 chance of voting 
correctly has a 0.98 chance of making the correct decision by majority rule; only a dictator with 
[competence greater than] 0.98 would do better, and there may be no one in the population who is 
that wise. Hence, more stupid voters are likely to reach better decisions than a few wise ones. 
Adam Przeworksi, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 27 (Ian 
Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). 
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Potentially submajoritarian lottery voting of this sort might in principle be used to select 
representatives72 or jurors73; to make preliminary, procedural or collateral decisions, 
including agenda-setting in the face of cyclical majorities;74 or to make ultimate 
substantive decisions.75 In the last case, the Jury Theorem helps to explain or rather 
justify the failure of lottery-voting proposals to find any market among real-world 
constitutional designers. Whereas preliminary decisions are usually value choices, not 
technical or causal decisions that can be more or less accurate, substantive decisions often 
or sometimes do possess the latter feature, and will thus fall within the Jury Theorem’s 
scope. This problem would be obviated if lottery-voting rules were tailored to apply only 
to preliminary and procedural decisions of value choice, rather than ultimate substantive 
decisions. A continuing puzzle, for which I have no answer, is why that chastened form 
of lottery voting is rare or nonexistent. 
C. Selecting the status quo point 
We have seen that for every submajority rule there is a reciprocal supermajority rule, 
with a mirror-image status quo point. Why do those rules not exist, while the 
corresponding submajority rules do? Norms, or institutional designers, might say that the 
legislative roll must be called for every vote on final passage unless 4/5 + 1 opt for a 
voice vote; is there any reason to think that rule a bad one? There is a mirror-image 
                                                                                                                                                 
71 Richard Zeckhauser, Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives, 83 Quarterly Journal of Economics 
696 (1969). 
72 Akhil Reed Amar, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J 1283 (1984); Jon Elster, 
Solomonic Judgments: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality, 78-90 (1997). The latter notes that the 
choice of laws, as opposed to the choice of lawmakers, could be organized through lottery voting—either 
through random-agenda setting or random substantive decisions -- but states that “I do not know of any 
regime which has actually adopted this practice.” Id. at 90. 
73 Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury Reform, 34 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 133 (1996). 
74 Bruce A. Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 291-93 (1980 ). 
75 Robert Paul Wolff, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 44-45 (1998).  
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question about supermajority rules. Why should not the 3/5 rule for tax increases be a 
rule requiring 2/5 + 1 to reject any proposed tax increase? 
In some circumstances, submajority rules are undoubtedly equivalent to their 
supermajority reciprocals. As Kornhauser and Sager suggest,76 it is hard to believe that a 
Rule of Six—all certiorari petitions are on the docket unless six Justices vote to deny 
them—would produce any different results than the Rule of Four; abstentions are 
sufficiently rare on the Court, and the alternatives are sufficiently similar, that nothing 
turns on the location of the status quo point. But this equivalence does not hold generally. 
First, in some situations the supermajority reciprocal is conceptually ill-defined. 
Under standard procedures for recall elections, some submajority fraction—say, 15% of 
the number of voters in the last regular statewide election—are empowered to alter the 
status quo by putting the recall question on the ballot in a special statewide election. Here 
the idea of a supermajoritarian reciprocal is obscure; what would it mean to say that a 
recall question is always on the ballot (every day?) unless 85% + 1 affirmatively vote not 
to hold the recall election? The supermajority reciprocal is well-defined in the certiorari 
setting only because an outside actor—the litigant—is authorized to file a certiorari 
petition in the first place. In the direct-democracy setting, however, there is no 
exogenously-defined pool of potential questions that can be put on or off the agenda by 
supermajority voting. 
Second, even where the supermajority reciprocal is conceptually well-defined, 
transaction costs may make the status quo sticky, thereby making consequential the 
choice between a submajority rule and its supermajority reciprocal. A submajority rule 
                                                 
76 Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986). 
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will be preferable to the reciprocal supermajority rule where, and to the extent that, the 
costs of assembling the necessary submajority are appreciably lower than the costs of 
assembling the mirror-image supermajority. In small-group settings like the Supreme 
Court, these two costs will rarely diverge to any appreciable degree. But it is a mistake to 
generalize from small-group settings to large-number settings where the costs of 
assembling a submajority will be far lower than the costs of assembling a reciprocal 
supermajority. 
The extreme case involves mass democracy; for concreteness, I will use the recall 
example again. Under current law, recalls occur when a submajority puts the question on 
the statewide ballot. Suppose that, contrary to what I have said above, we could imagine a 
conceptually coherent reciprocal rule under which a recall election would be held (at 
stated intervals?) unless recall opponents could muster a statewide supermajority to block 
the recall question from the ballot. But this scheme is silly; the difference between the 
two rules only matters if there are a sufficient number of abstentions, but it is predictable 
that there will be many. Put differently, if abstentions could be reduced to such a degree 
that a large supermajority of the whole statewide electorate could be mustered to oppose 
the recall, the recall issue would in substance already have been decided on the merits; at 
the very least a preliminary vote on the agenda, rather than the merits, would be otiose. 
Numerically, and in terms of the costs of assembling requisite fractions of the whole 
voting pool, legislatures are an intermediate case between courts and direct democracy. 
Submajority rules will sometimes matter in legislatures, because the difference between 
the lower-bound cost and the upper-bound cost will sometimes be appreciable, in turn 
because absenteeism or abstention is a chronic condition both in committee and on the 
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floor. In a legislature that, like Congress at the beginning of the last century, is plagued 
by absenteeism, the difference between obtaining 145 signatures in favor of a discharge 
petition (under the pre-1935 submajority rule) and obtaining 291 signatures against a 
discharge petition (under the reciprocal supermajority rule) is highly consequential. 
Under the latter rule, the greater costs of assembling the requisite coalition would 
create greater scope for strategic behavior. Which bills would be subject to possible 
discharge (unless a contrary supermajority could be assembled?) Note that a smaller 
minority than the fraction required by the submajority rule (here, 1/3 of the House) must, 
in such a regime, be entitled to force a supermajority to coalesce against discharge on any 
bill. In that case the opportunity for strategic abuse will be greater, and the resulting costs 
of delay higher, than under the submajority rule. If the submajority rule already strikes 
the right balance between the costs of delay, on the one hand, and the benefits of forcing 
accountability upon the majority, on the other, then the combination of a reciprocal 
supermajority rule with a lower-than-submajoritarian trigger will be nonoptimal. 
The foregoing account does not quite explain the submajority trigger for the Journal 
Clause, under which the agreement of 1/5 of those present suffices to mandate a roll-call 
vote. If an extremely small number were present, the costs of assembling the 1/5 
submajority or of assembling the reciprocal 4/5 + 1 supermajority (to deny a roll-call 
vote) would be similar. With small numbers, however, the minority will be able to allege 
the absence of a quorum in any event, so there may never be any vote on which a roll-call 
could be taken; while with large numbers the costs of assembling the requisite fractions is 
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significant.77 So this wrinkle in the Journal Clause is a distinctly second-decimal issue.  
   D.  Reversibility 
I have left to the end the most conspicuous problem with submajority rules: the 
possibility that submajoritarian decisions are exposed to reversal by subsequent 
majorities, and are thus chronically unstable. If one hundred-odd legislators may 
discharge a bill from committee, why may not two hundred and eighteen just send it back 
again? If four Justices may grant certiorari, what happens if five dismiss certiorari as 
improvidently granted? And if a small plurality puts Candidate S into office in a recall 
election, may not the majority that split their votes among other candidates subsequently 
recall S in turn, with an endless cycle of recalls in prospect? 
Buchanan and Tullock showed that majority rule is the lowest-decision-cost voting 
rule that guarantees stability,78 but subsequent work slid towards, if not into, the casual 
assumption that submajority rules are therefore infeasible or even nonexistent.79 But 
instability is just another institutional problem to be managed; it is a cost to be weighed 
against the benefits of submajority rules, rather than a hard constraint on the very 
possibility of such rules. The tempting mistake here is to assume that an institutional 
problem with a given voting rule can be solved only by adjusting the institution along the 
same margin, by using a different voting rule.80 In fact there are at least two other 
                                                 
77 See Tiefer, supra note ---, at 358 (noting that, with 300 members present, the required 1/5 (= 60 
members) is difficult to assemble). 
78 James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 211 (1962); see also Neal Reimer, 
The Case for Bare Majority Rule, 62 Ethics 16 (1951).  
79 See, e.g., Mueller, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 76-77; see also the work cited immediately below. 
80 See, e.g., Matthias Messner & Matthias Polborn, Voting on Majority Rules (Aug. 19, 2001)(unpublished 
manuscript), at 10: “Of course, a ‘submajority rule’ (corresponding to a less than 50 percent majority) is 
difficult to implement for stability reasons, because both a proposal and its exact opposite could be passed. 
Therefore, the best society can do (given this stability constraint) is again to choose a simple majority rule.” 
The second sentence does not follow from the first, even given the author’s other assumptions, except on 
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margins on which institutions may act to cope with the potential instability that the 
reversibility problem creates. First, institutions may protect submajoritarian decisions 
from reversal through formal rules, or informal norms, that bar defeated majorities from 
reversing or undermining a submajoritarian decision—at least not right away, or not 
without intervening changes. Second, and more interestingly, institutions may use 
submajority rules for decisions that are costly or impossible to reverse. I will take up 
these possibilities in turn. 
Institutions that use submajority rules may develop written rules or unwritten norms 
that preclude or limit reversals by subsequent majorities. A judicial example involves the 
conventions surrounding the Rule of Four: 
The Court has construed and applied the Rule of Four so as to require all Justices to 
consider the case on the merits, following the grant of certiorari on four votes. Most 
members of the Court have felt that the other five Justices who did not vote to grant 
are thereafter precluded from voting to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted 
in the absence of additional intervening factors which were not known or fully 
appreciated at the time certiorari was granted.81 
 
The last clause is vague, and has occasionally given rise to intracourt controversies 
where five Justices dismissed a case over the dissents of four Justices, with the latter 
group complaining that no intervening circumstances warranted the action. At various 
points, therefore, Justices have claimed that the Court does or should adhere to a stricter 
practice in which no petition can be dismissed as improvidently granted, even given 
changed circumstances, unless one of the four Justices in the granting bloc switches her 
                                                                                                                                                 
the additional and rather arbitrary assumption that the only choice variable for institutional designers is the 
voting rule itself. In a similar vein is Giovanni Maggi and Massimo Morelli, Self-Enforcing Voting in 
International Organizations (Dec. 10, 2002)(unpublished manuscript), at 9 & n.8.  
81 Robert L. Stern et al., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 297 (8th ed. 2002). 
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vote.82 There is inconsistency and variation in these practices over time; all of the 
relevant practices are politically fraught. But the general picture is that strong normative 
rules dampen the potential instability of the submajoritarian agenda rule; marginal 
fluctuations in the rules or norms should not impress us too much. It is quite clear that the 
ability of subsequent majorities to reverse a grant of certiorari is sharply constrained, 
relative to a hypothetical baseline in which no such rules or norms exist. 
Legislatures may also develop rules or norms that dampen or control reversals. 
Crudely, we may distinguish formal rules from structural arrangements. To illustrate the 
first category, consider the problems arising when a submajority’s discharge petition is 
brought to the floor. The majority that controls the bill’s subsequent fate may well be the 
same majority that controls the committees whose jurisdiction has been ousted 
(depending upon the degree of agency slack between committees and floor); so a danger 
is that the floor majority will block the discharged bill through procedural subterfuges, or 
simply by refusing to take up the bill for a final substantive vote if it is not privileged 
business. Thus, under the submajority discharge rules obtaining in 1924, the Howell-
Barkley bill for settling railway labor disputes was discharged by a submajority, but 
eventually died after its initial consideration; its supporters could never obtain a majority 
to move the bill out of the pile of “unfinished business” in order to force final 
consideration.83 In 1931, therefore, a near-unanimous House adopted new rules that 
“explicitly provided for the consideration of discharged measures as privileged business 
                                                 
82 Stern et al., supra note ---, at 298.  
83 Historically, this is a rather ambiguous case, because it is not clear whether a majority of the whole 
House would have supported the bill on final passage. Although the motion to discharge the bill from 
committee prevailed 194 to 181, a later majority voted 144-134 to strike out the enacting clause (rendering 
the bill inoperative); a yet later majority defeated a motion to refer the bill back to committee, 201-181. See 
Hasbrouck, supra note ---, at 160-61.  
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after their initial consideration,” effectively ensuring discharged bills an up-or-down 
vote.84 Comparing Congress to the Supreme Court, the 1924 disposition of the Howell-
Barkley bill is analogous to a dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted over four 
dissents, while the 1931 rule is analogous to the rule, or norm, that bars dismissals by a 
five-Justice coalition who lost at the certiorari stage. 
Structural arrangements may also shield submajority decisions from majoritarian 
reversal. This category is illustrated when submajority rules are created by a delegation 
from a higher-level majority, as in the case of House Rule XI. The submajority rule may 
be repealable by the higher-level majority, but unless and until that occurs the decisions 
reached under the rules by lower-level submajorities (say, a committee minority) are 
structurally immune from reversal by lower-level majorities (say, a committee majority). 
Given that submajority rules more easily cope with the reversal problem when they arise 
by delegation from a higher-level majority, we should not be surprised that 
submajoritarian voting rules are, in Congress, more common at the committee level than 
at the floor level. 
Institutional rules and norms, whether formal or structural, are not the only way to 
safeguard submajoritarian decisions from reversal. Alternatively, some decisions might 
be costly to reverse or even intrinsically irreversible; and institutions might sensibly 
restrict submajority rules to that class of issues. We have seen that, as an empirical 
regularity, submajority rules often permit minorities to throw information into the public 
domain, by requiring roll-call votes that may be witnessed by spectators and later 
published in the legislative journals, by calling witnesses at committee hearings who will 
                                                 
84 Binder, supra note ---, at 149 n.28. 
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submit facts or arguments that undermine the majority’s preferred narrative, or by 
extracting documents or information from the executive. If there is a deep connection 
between submajority rules and information, the key to explaining it is that decisions 
about information are in some cases intrinsically irreversible. 
The basic asymmetry arises when a decision to reveal information today precludes a 
decision to conceal the same information tomorrow. Once published, perhaps by a 
submajoritarian decision, the information circulates beyond the power of subsequent 
majorities to suppress, whether or not they possess legal authority to do so. This is a 
familiar idea in macrolevel political theory. Tom Paine mocked Burke’s futile attempt to 
check the spread of popular enlightenment: “Ignorance is of a peculiar nature; once 
dispelled, it is impossible to re-establish it.” This is the “irreversibility thesis”85: once the 
veils have been ripped away from obscurantist traditionalism, they can never be restored. 
The same mechanism operates at the microlevel of institutional design. Once the 
opposing witnesses have been heard in public session, or their testimony placed in the 
record; once the executive branch has been forced to divulge information to committee 
minorities; once the roll-call votes have been published in the newspapers; what is there 
for subsequent majorities to reverse? The general account, then, is that submajority rules 
often apply to decisions about information simply because natural asymmetries between 
decisional alternatives make the reversal problem less significant in these settings. 
IV. Conclusion 
Submajority rules exist; they have, in some circumstances and at some cost, attractive 
normative properties; and they are not fatally enfeebled by the instability arising from the 
                                                 
85 Don Herzog, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 86 (1998). 
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threat of later majoritarian reversals. Legal and political theory has obsessed over 
supermajority rules while dismissing their submajority reciprocals, or competitors, due to 
a widespread assumption that one or more of the foregoing claims must be false. Yet 
submajority rules appear to be a useful, and frequently-used, tool for institutional 
designers. Such rules entail both costs and benefits, and are on net appropriate only in 
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